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Abstract—Building the joint probability distribution (JPD) of
wind power and its forecast for correlated wind farms (WFs)
is critical because one can derive the conditional probability
distribution of wind power or its forecast error at a given forecast
value from the JPD and then generate scenarios or calculate
quantiles from it for the stochastic analysis of power systems.
The traditional centralized approach for modeling the JPD faces
problems such as expensive high bandwidth, limited scalability
and lack of robustness to communication failures. A distributed
modeling algorithm is an alternative but will reveal the privacy
of WFs due to the exchange of raw data information between
neighbors. Based on the Gaussian mixture model (GMM), this
paper proposes a privacy-preserving distributed expectation-
maximization algorithm to build the JPD based on additive
homomorphic encryption, binary hash function and the average
consensus algorithm. The correctness and the robustness to
communication failures of the proposed algorithm are empirically
verified using historical data.
Index Terms—Wind power, Probability distribution, Data pri-
vacy protection, Distributed algorithm, Gaussian mixture model,
Expectation-maximization algorithm
I. INTRODUCTION
W IND power (WP) is clearly outlining the future sus-tainable energy systems. As a common idea to ad-
dress the uncertainty of WP, the chance-constrained optimal
schedule with wind farms (WFs) has been investigated by
many researchers, e.g., chance-constrained unit commitment
[3]–[5], chance-constrained economic dispatch [7], or chance-
constrained ramping reserve schedule [8]. In those studies, the
probability distribution of WP is established first and serves as
the foundation for sampling techniques or quantile calculation
techniques to deal with the chance constraints.
When establishing a probability distribution, two issues
must be clearly considered: (1) which uncertain factors to
set as random variables and (2) which probability distribution
model to use. For the first issue, the above studies set WP and
WP forecast (WPF) as variables so that once a new forecast
value is generated, it can be substituted into the probability
distribution to obtain a conditional probability distribution of
WP or its forecast error at the given forecast value [3]–[5], [7],
[8]. For the second issue, the researchers in [3]–[5] assume that
the uncertainty of WP follows a Gaussian distribution. How-
ever, the Gaussian assumption may result in inaccuracy since
WP is a non-Gaussian random variable [7]. Other distribution
model assumptions are also made, e.g., Weibull distribution
[5], Cauchy distribution [10] and versatile distribution [12].
Although the Cauchy distribution fits better than the Weibull
distribution in some certain timescales [10], this distribution,
as well as the versatile distribution, are ’unimodal’, which
cannot capture the ’multi-peaks’ characteristic of WP [13]. The
Gaussian mixture model (GMM), which can characterize ran-
dom variables subject to an arbitrary distribution and arbitrary
dimensions with remarkable performance, has been gradually
applied for characterizing the uncertainty in WP [7], [8]. In
this paper, we also take multiple WP and WPF of correlated
WFs as random variables, and we choose the GMM to build
their joint probability distribution (JPD).
The expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is the most
commonly used algorithm for training GMM [14]–[17]. The
traditional approach is to collect all historical WP and WPF
data and send them to a third-party data center to train the
GMM-based JPD, known as the centralized EM algorithm.
However, the centralized EM algorithm requires expensive
high bandwidth communication between the data center and
every WF [18]. Meanwhile, due to its limited scalability
[19], variations of the network topology will highlight the
inflexibility of centralized algorithms. Furthermore, the failure
of any communication line will result in the disconnection
of a WF and all its data. To overcome the above problems,
a distributed EM algorithm is a feasible alternative [24]–
[27]. However, those distributed EM algorithms require the
exchange of data between WFs. To protect data privacy, WFs
with different stakeholders may be reluctant to share raw
data with each other. Therefore, this paper aims to develop
a privacy-preserving distributed (PPD) EM algorithm to train
the GMM-based JPD for correlated WFs.
In the data-mining field, many efforts have focused on the
PPD EM algorithm [20]–[23]. In [20], [21], a PPD EM algo-
rithm is proposed based on the secure sum technique, which
can accurately calculate the sum of data without revealing the
data privacy of any parties; a cyclic communication topology
is adopted to complete the algorithm. Using the additive
homomorphic encryption technique to encode the raw data
into a cryptographic message, Kaleb et al. present their PPD
EM algorithm [22]. To prevent the leakage of data privacy
when an adversary is in control of multiple parties, Kaleb et
al. enforce one-way communication across a ring topology
to guarantee the corruption-resistant feature of the proposed
algorithm. Similar to [22], Yang et al. also utilize the additive
homomorphic encryption technique to keep raw data safe [23].
The difference is that Yang et al. design a locally and globally
secure summation protocol, and cryptographic messages are
sent through a spanning tree communication topology.
However, the above PPD EM algorithms mentioned in
[20]–[23], even including the privacy-free distributed (PFD)
EM algorithms in [24]–[27], cannot be applied to the JPD
modeling for correlated WFs because both the PPD and the
PFD EM algorithms are designed for ”horizontally partitioned
data”. In fact, WP and WPF data are ”vertically partitioned”
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among correlated WFs. Take 3 parties and 100 samples of
3-dimensional random variables as an example. Data are
horizontally partitioned refers to the situation where party
A owns 30 samples of 3-dimensional data, party B owns
40 samples, and party C owns 30 samples, while data are
vertically partitioned means that each party owns 100 samples,
but each of them only has 1 dimension of the 3-dimensional
data. Since building the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs needs
full multidimensional data but each WF only has its own
historical WP and WPF data as 2 dimensions of the full multi-
dimensional data, WP and WPF data are vertically partitioned
among correlated WFs. To the best of our knowledge, a PPD
EM algorithm to address the vertically partitioned data (VPD)
has rarely been proposed in the literature.
Moreover, the PPD EM algorithms in [20]–[23] are not
fully distributed. Both the preselected cyclic communication
topology in [20]–[22] and the preselected spanning tree com-
munication topology in [23] need a global perspective for
preselection. In particular, selecting a cyclic topology is a
Hamiltonian circuit problem and is proven to be NP-complete
[24]. Meanwhile, the failure of any communication line on the
preselected path will cause the whole algorithm to fail.
In this paper, we aim to solve the above two problems. The
original contributions of this paper are threefold:
1) A PPD EM algorithm for vertically partitioned data is
proposed. It consists of two original algorithms: a PPD
summation algorithm for the E-step and a PPD inner
product algorithm for the M-step.
2) The proposed PPD EM algorithm only needs neighbor-
ing communication with no preselected path; thus, it is
fully distributed. Meanwhile, it is robust to communica-
tion line failures.
3) Based on the proposed PPD EM algorithm and GMM,
we have built the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs for
correlated WFs in a distributed manner with strict data
privacy protection.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, the keys to the realization of the PPD EM algorithm are
demonstrated. The PPD summation algorithm is proposed in
Section III, and the PPD inner product algorithm is developed
in Section IV. In Section V, the PPD EM algorithm for building
the JPD of multiple WPs and WPFs is proposed. Case studies
are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes
this paper.
II. ESSENCE OF THE EM ALGORITHM FOR VPD
In this section, the centralized EM algorithm for GMM is
introduced first. Then, the essence of the EM algorithm for
the VPD is demonstrated.
A. The centralized EM algorithm for GMM
For M spatially correlated WFs, their WP and WPF consti-
tute a 2M-dimensional random variable X ∈ R2M , which is
defined as X = [xp1, ...,xpM ,xf1, ...,xfM ]. Elements xpm
and xfm in X represent the WP and the WPF of the m-th
WF, respectively. As a convex combination of J multivariate
Gaussian distributions with its weighted coefficient wj ∈ R,
mean vector µj ∈ R2M and covariance Σj ∈ R2M×2M , the
GMM-based joint PDF of X is given in (1):
P (X|θ) =
J∑
j=1
wjN (X|µj ,Σj) (1)
where N (·) is a 2M-dimensional Gaussian distribution and
θ = {wj ,µj ,Σj |j = 1, 2, ..., J} is the parameter set of the
GMM-based joint PDF.
Training set S ∈ RN×2M consists of N historical obser-
vations of X. The n-th observation is described as ςn =
[sn,1, ..., sn,2M ], where sn,m is the n-th WP observation of
the m-th WF, while sn,M+m is its n-th WPF observation.
The closed-form expression of the centralized EM algorithm
consists of the expectation step (E-step) and maximization step
(M-step). For a detailed proof and derivation, refer to [17]. For
the k-th iteration, the centralized E-step is given in (2), and
the centralized M-step in (3):
Qkj,n =
wk−1j N (ςn;µk−1j ,Σk−1j )∑J
j=1 w
k−1
j N(ςn;µ
k−1
j ,Σ
k−1
j )
(2)
wkj =
1
N
N∑
n=1
Qkj,n (3a)
µkj =
∑N
n=1Q
k
j,nςn∑N
n=1Q
k
j,n
(3b)
Σkj =
∑N
n=1Q
k
j,n(ςn − µkj )T (ςn − µkj )∑N
n=1Q
k
j,n
(3c)
where T represents the transpose of a vector or matrix. After
convergence, the estimation of θ is achieved, and the GMM-
based joint PDF is established. Since the calculation processes
are the same for every Gaussian component in every iteration,
we will omit the subscripts k and j in later derivations when
it does not cause ambiguity.
B. The essence of the E-step for VPD
The E-step aims to calculate the statistics Qn in (2) by
the parameter θ updated from the last iteration. The main
calculation is to compute N (·) in (4). However, the part that
actually involves ςn only exists in the exponential term of (4),
as given in (5), where δm,i ∈ R represents the element of Σ−1
in the m-th row and i-th column, and the m-th or i-th element
of µ is represented by µm, µi ∈ R.
N (ςn|µ,Σ) =
exp[− 12 (ςn − µ)Σ−1(ςn − µ)T ]√
(2pi)2Mdet(Σ)
(4)
n = −1
2
(ςn − µ)Σ−1(ςn − µ)T
= −1
2
2M∑
i=1
(sn,i − µi)
2M∑
m=1
δm,i(sn,m − µm)
(5)
ρi =
2M∑
m=1
δm,i(sn,m − µm) (6)
n = −1
2
2M∑
i=1
ρi(sn,i − µi) ∝
2M∑
i=1
ρi(sn,i − µi) (7)
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Equation (5) shows that, for VPD, the E-step can be divided
into two summations among every WF. One is given in (6), and
the other is in (7). A unified form for (6) and (7) is given in (8).
Since θ is already updated from the last iteration, for the m-th
WF, sharing δm,i(sn,m − µm) or δM+m,i(sn,M+m − µM+m)
with others is essentially sharing its raw data sn,m or sn,M+m.
Meanwhile, although sharing the sum of the above two is an
alternative, since WP and WPF are very close, other WFs can
still estimate the WP and WPF to some extent from the sum.
Therefore, how to calculate (8) in a distributed manner under
the premise of data privacy preservation is the key for realizing
the E-step with VPD.
Yn =
M∑
m=1
yn,m , n = 1, 2, ..., N
yn,m =

δm,i(sn,m − µm)
+ δM+m,i(sn,M+m − µM+m) For (6),
ρm(sn,m − µm)
+ ρM+m(sn,M+m − µM+m) For (7).
(8)
C. The essence of the M-step for VPD
The M-step aims to update θ in (3) by the Qn calculated
from the E-step. Since Qn is already obtained by all WFs
as public knowledge, every WF can directly compute (3a) to
update ω. The calculations that actually involve ςn exist in
(3b) and (3c).
µ =
[∑N
n=1Qnsn,1∑N
n=1Qn
· · ·
∑N
n=1Qnsn,2m∑N
n=1Qn
]
(9)
µm =
N∑
n=1
Qnsn,m
/ N∑
n=1
Qn =
N∑
n=1
cnsn,m (10)
cn = Qn
/ N∑
n=1
Qn (11)
σm,m =
N∑
n=1
Qn(sn,m − µm)2
/ N∑
n=1
Qn
=
N∑
n=1
cn(sn,m − µm)2 (12)
σm,i =
N∑
n=1
Qn(sn,m − µm)(sn,i − µi)
/ N∑
n=1
Qn
=
N∑
n=1
cn(sn,m − µm)(sn,i − µi) (13)
= 〈zm, zi〉 (14)
zm = [
√
c1(s1,m − µm) · · · √cn(sn,m − µm)] (15)
zi = [
√
c1(s1,i − µi) · · · √cn(sN,i − µi)] (16)
The details of (3b) are in (9), where the m-th element of µ
is given in (10). Due to the VPD, the m-th WF can compute
µm and µM+m in (10) by itself. Because no WF can deduce
N observations from the result of (10), each WF can share
its µm and µM+m with other WFs since no data privacy is
sacrificed.
For further investigation of (3c), the diagonal and nondiag-
onal elements of Σ are provided in (12) and (13), respectively.
Due to the VPD, the m-th WF can only compute σm,m and
σM+m,M+m in (12). However, the same as µm in (10), neither
σm,m nor σM+m,M+m contains private information because
no WF can deduce the N observations from them. Thus, each
WF can share them with others.
However, the situation is completely different when calcu-
lating σm,i in (13) because historical observations of the m-th
WF and the i-th WF are both needed to compute an inner
product of vectors zm ∈ RN and zi ∈ RN in (14). Since cn,
µm and µi are all public knowledge after the calculation of
(2) and (3b), sharing (sn,m−µm) or (sn,i−µi) is essentially
sharing sn,m or sn,i, which reveals privacy. Therefore, how
to calculate (14) for any two WFs in a distributed manner
under the premise of data privacy preservation is the key for
realizing the M-step with VPD.
III. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED
SUMMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, the average consensus algorithm is first
briefly introduced. Then, a PPD summation algorithm is
proposed based on the average consensus algorithm and the
additive homomorphic encryption technique to calculate (8) in
a fully distributed manner considering privacy protection.
A. The Average Consensus Algorithm
To calculate (8) in a fully distributed manner, the aver-
age consensus algorithm is a common approach [36]. Some
definitions are presented before the demonstration. The com-
munication topology of M spatially correlated WFs is rep-
resented by a graph G = (ν, ξ), where ν denotes the set
of nodes ν = {ν1, ν2, ..., νM} and ξ denotes the set of
edges ξ ⊆ ν × ν. Once the distance between two nodes
is less than a preset distance threshold η, the two nodes
are connected. The neighbors of node m are denoted by
Nm = {νi ∈ ν : (νm, νi) ∈ ξ}. The weighted adjacency
matrix of G is represented by A ∈ RM×M with adjacent
coefficient {αm,i|m, i = 1, ...,M} in (17), where |Nm| and
|Ni| denote the degrees of nodes m and i. A is a symmetric
matrix, and A1 = 1, where 1 = [1, ..., 1]T ∈ RM .
αm,i =

2
|Nm|+|Ni|+1 νi ∈ Nm,
1− ∑
νi∈Nm
2
|Nm|+|Ni|+1 νi = νi,
0 others
(17)
Y t+1n,m = Y
t
n,m +
∑
νi∈Nm
αm,i
[
Y tn,i − Y tn,m
]
= αm,mY
t
n,m +
∑
νi∈Nm
αm,iY
t
n,i (18)
Y 0n,m = yn,m (19)
lim
t→∞Y
t
n,m =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Y 0n,m =
1
M
M∑
m=1
yn,m (20)
The discrete form of the average consensus algorithm is
presented in (20). After convergence, the average value of (8)
is achieved by every WF in a distributed manner. From a local
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perspective, each WF only needs to collect αm,iYn,i from its
neighbors to calculate a local summation in (18) during each
iteration. However, in the first iteration, Y 0n,m = yn,m of each
WF is revealed to its neighbors. Thus, the average consensus
algorithm is not privacy preserving.
B. The PPD Summation Algorithm
To achieve the local summation in (18) under the premise
of protecting privacy, the Paillier cryptosystem, as an additive
homomorphic encryption technique, is a feasible choice and
is favored by many researchers for the analysis of social
networks [23] or the Internet [30]. It is also adopted in this
paper.
ct = Epk(pt, H) (21)
pt = Dsk(ct, H) (22)
Dsk
(
M∏
m=1
ctm mod H2
)
=
M∑
m=1
ptm mod H (23)
cti = Epk(αm,iY
0
n,i, H), ∀νi ∈ Nm (24)
ctm = Epk(R0, H), for νm (25)
ctd = ctm ×
∏|Nm|
i=1
cti (26)
Dsk
(
ctd mod H2
)
=
∑|Nm|
i=1
αm,iY
0
n,i +R0 (27)
Algorithm 1: The PPD summation algorithm
Input: ∀νm ∈ ν with its yn,m.
Output: ∀νm ∈ ν obtains
∑M
m=1 yn,m.
while convergence criterion is not met do
for m = 1 to M do
01 t = 0;
if t=0 then
02 ∀νi ∈ Nm computes (24);
03 νm computes (25) and sends ctm to ν1;
04 ν1 computes (27) and sends it to νm ;
05 νm subtracts R0 and obtains∑|Nm|
i=1 αm,iY
0
n,i;
06 νm completes the calculation of (18);
07 t = t+ 1;
else
08 ∀νi ∈ Nm sends αm,iY tn,i to νm ;
09 νm completes the calculation of (18);
10 t = t+ 1;
end
end
end
for m = 1 to M do
11 νm computes
∑M
m=1 yn,m = M × Yn,m
end
Let pt ∈ Z denote a plaintext, ct ∈ Z denote a ciphertext
and H denote a prespecified large prime integer. The encryp-
tion process with a public key pk is in (21), and decryption
with a secret key sk is in (22). To compute the sum of
M plaintexts, the decrypter only needs the corresponding M
ciphertexts for the multiplication calculation and then decrypts
it, as given in (23). The entire process strictly protects data
privacy. For more details, refer to [35]. Inspired by the secure
summation protocol in [23], we utilize the Paillier cryptosys-
tem to compute (18) to maintain data privacy, and then we
develop a PPD summation algorithm based on the average
consensus algorithm: for the m-th WF in the first iteration of
the average consensus algorithm, its neighbors numbered from
1 to |Nm| encrypt their initial value by the 1st neighbor’s pk in
(24). However, the m-th WF instead encrypts a random number
R0 in (25). Then, neighbors send their ciphertexts to the m-th
WF, and the m-th WF performs the multiplication calculation
in (26) and sends it to the 1st neighbor. Thereafter, the 1st
neighbor decrypts ct into the summation in (27) and sends
it back to the m-th WF. Finally, the m-th WF subtracts R0 to
obtain the result of (18). For the latter iteration, because no one
can deduce the initial data from the exchange, no encryption
is needed. Details are available in Algorithm 1.
IV. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED INNER
PRODUCT ALGORITHM
For the inner product calculation, once the angle βm,i in
(28) is obtained, by sharing the norm ‖zm‖ ∈ R and ‖zi‖ ∈
R, which will not reveal any raw data, the inner product can
be directly calculated. Therefore, the problem becomes how to
approximate the angle between two vectors under the premise
of data privacy preservation.
In an N-dimensional space, the probability of finding a
random hyperplane separating two vectors zm and zi is pro-
portional to the angle βm,i [41]. For calculating the probability,
a publicly known random vector set Γ ∈ RN×L is first
defined, where each column is a random vector γl ∈ RN .
Then, the probability is given in (29), which is essentially the
Hamming distance calculation between two binary hash codes
[42]. For a further demonstration, the binary hash function
h : RN 7→ RL, as given in (30), is defined, where the sign
function can encode an L-dimensional real vector into an
L-dimensional binary vector according to the sign of each
element in the real vector, e.g., if L = 4 , a = [−1, 3, 2,−5]T ,
then sign(a) = [0, 1, 1, 0]T . Thus, h (zm) actually represents
the sign information of the multiplication results between zm
and ∀γl ∈ Γ. Once h (zm) and h (zi) are obtained, (29) can
easily be computed by counting the number of different sign
pairs. Note that the counting process is essentially calculating
the Hamming distance between h (zm) and h (zi) [42], as
represented by Ham[h (zm) , h (zi)]. Therefore, based on the
binary hash function and Hamming distance, the angle βm,i
can be calculated by (31). For error analysis, please refer to
[42].
〈zm, zi〉 = ‖zm‖‖zi‖ cosβm,i (28)
Pr{γl ∈ Γ :
(
zTmγl
) (
zTi γl
)
< 0} = βm,i
pi
(29)
h (zm) = sign
(
zTmΓ
)
(30)
βm,i =
pi
L
Ham[h (zm) , h (zi)] (31)
Our goal is not only to calculate the inner product of two
vectors under the premise of protecting privacy but also to
obtain all the inner products between any two WFs through
a locally distributed manner. For computing all the inner
product values, the set {‖zm‖, h (zm) |m = 1, ..., 2M} is
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required. Thus, based on the binary hash function and the
average consensus algorithm, the PPD inner product algorithm
is proposed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: The PPD inner product algorithm
Input: ∀νm ∈ ν with its zm and zM+m.
Output: ∀νm ∈ ν obtains 〈zm, zi〉 for m, i = 1, ..., 2M
01 ∀νm ∈ ν computes its h (zm) and h (zM+m)via (30);
02 ∀νm ∈ ν converts them into decimal dm and dM+m;
03 ∀νm ∈ ν formulates its Y 0m = [..., dm, ..., dM+m, ...],
where dm is the m-th element and dM+m is the
(M+m)-th element. Other elements are 0;
04 ∀νm ∈ ν computes (18) with its Y 0m as input until
convergence ;
05 ∀νm ∈ ν multiplies the convergence result by M to
obtain dm for m = 1, ..., 2M ;
06 ∀νm ∈ ν converts dm into binary h (zm) for
m = 1, ..., 2M ;
07 ∀νm ∈ ν computes its ‖zm‖ and ‖zM+m‖;
08 Repeat line 02 to line 05 while replace dm and
dM+m by ‖zm‖ and ‖zM+m‖;
11 ∀νm ∈ ν computes (31) for m, i = 1, ..., 2M ;
12 ∀νm ∈ ν computes (28) for m, i = 1, ..., 2M ;
V. THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING DISTRIBUTED EM
ALGORITHM
Since the two difficulties mentioned in Section II are solved
by the proposed PPD summation and inner product algorithm,
the PPD EM algorithm for building the GMM-based JPD
of multiple spatially correlated WFs is eventually developed.
The details of the proposed PPD EM algorithm are provided
in Algorithm 3, where the PPD E-step is developed by the
proposed PPD summation algorithm, and the PPD M-step is
developed by the proposed PPD inner product algorithm. The
advantages of the proposed PPD EM algorithm are as follows:
Strict privacy preserving. For the summation calculation in
the PPD E-step, the Paillier cryptosystem is used to protect
the raw data; for the inner product calculation in the PPD M-
step, the binary hash function is used to prevent data privacy
disclosure. The two techniques that we utilized can strictly
protect privacy because no WF can deduce any raw data
information from the calculation process.
Fully distributed. As we introduce the average consensus
algorithm into the PPD E-step and M-step, each WF only
needs to communicate with its neighbors. Thus, we avoid the
assumption made in [20], [30], [31] that any two nodes are
connected, and we improve the scalability of the proposed
algorithm. Meanwhile, no preselected path for communication
is required as in [20]–[23]. Thus, the proposed algorithm is
fully distributed.
Robust. As the communication between neighbors may
fail, robustness to communication failure is necessary. Since
the proposed PPD EM algorithm is developed based on the
average consensus algorithm, as long as the communication
network topology is still connected, the communication failure
basically will not affect the final modeling results due to the
consensus feature.
Algorithm 3: The PPD EM algorithm
Initialization:
01 Set ω0j , µ
0
j and Σ
0
j for j = 1, ..., J ;
02 Set k=1;
The PPD E-step:
for j = 1 to J and n = 1 to N do
03 Define ω = ωk−1j , µ = µ
k−1
j , Σ = Σ
k−1
j ;
04 Input: ∀νm ∈ ν with yn,m for (6) ;
05 Performing Algorithm 1;
06 Output: ∀νm ∈ ν obtains ρi =
∑2M
m=1 yn,m;
07 Input: ∀νm ∈ ν with its yn,m for (7);
08 Performing Algorithm 1;
09 Output: ∀νm ∈ ν obtains n = − 12
∑2M
m=1 yn,m;
10 ∀νm ∈ ν computes (4) via n;
11 ∀νm ∈ ν updates Qkj,n in (2) via the result of (4);
end
The PPD M-step:
for j = 1 to J do
12 ∀νm ∈ ν updates µm and µM+m in (10);
13 ∀νm ∈ ν updates σm,m and σM+m,M+m in (12);
14 ∀νm ∈ ν updates zm and zM+m in (14);
15 ∀νm ∈ ν formulates Y 0m = [..., µm, ..., µM+m, ...],
where µm is the m-th element and µM+m is the
(M+m)-th element. Other elements are 0;
16 ∀νm ∈ ν computes (18) with its Y 0m as input
until convergence ;
17 ∀νm ∈ ν multiplies the convergence result by M
to obtain µm for m = 1, ..., 2M ;
18 Repeat line 15 to line 17 while replacing µm and
µM+m by σm,m and σM+m,M+m;
19 Input: ∀νm ∈ ν with its zm and zM+m;
20 Performing Algorithm 2;
21 Output: ∀νm ∈ ν obtains σm,i for
m, i = 1, ..., 2M ;
22 ∀νm ∈ ν obtains ωkj by (3) directly;
23 ∀νm ∈ ν updates µkj = [µ1, ..., µ2M ];
24 ∀νm ∈ ν obtains Σkj =
 σ1,1 · · · σ1,2M... . . . ...
σM,1 · · · σM,2M
;
end
25 Set k = k + 1;
26 Loop the PPD E-step and M-step until convergence;
VI. CASE STUDY
The historical data of WP and WPF are from the eastern
wind integration data set published by the National Renewable
Energy Laboratory (NREL) [43], where we choose 9 WFs in
Maryland, numbered as 4401, 5405, 6211, 6359, 6526, 6812,
6931, 7187, and 7460. Each WF possesses 20 days of hourly
WP and WPF data. Thus, M = 9 and N = 480. We aim
to build the JPD of the WP and WPF of the 9 spatially
correlated WFs, which is a typical data vertical partitioning
problem. Since the privacy-preserving feature of the proposed
algorithms has already been discussed in the previous sections,
this section mainly aims to verify the correctness and robust-
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ness of the proposed algorithm by inspecting the modeling
result of JPD.
A. Correctness of the PPD Summation Algorithm
First, we use the WP data of 9 WFs at 2004/1/1-01:00
as input, and we use the proposed algorithm to estimate the
summation of the 9 data points. Since we do not know which
η is appropriate, we gradually increase η from 1 km to 4 km.
Several communication topologies under given η are provided
in Fig. 1(a) for a better understanding, and the estimation
results for all WFs under different η are shown in Fig. 1(b).
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Fig. 1. (a) Communication topology under different distance thresholds; (b)
Estimated result under different distance thresholds
In Fig. 1(a), once the threshold reaches 2.5 km, the connec-
tivity of the network topology is achieved, and the consensus
of estimation is achieved by all WFs in Fig. 1(b). Therefore,
to save the construction cost of communication lines, we set
η as 2.5 km. In fact, Fig. 1(b) already shows the correctness
of the proposed PPD summation algorithm because each WF
reaches consensus and obtains the real summation result.
B. Correctness of the PPD Inner Product Algorithm
Since the 20-day historical WP data of one WF can be
regarded as its private vector, to verify the correctness of
the proposed PPD inner product algorithm, we calculate the
inner products between every two WFs’ private vectors by the
algorithm. Because our algorithm enables every WF to obtain
the inner products, we define the inner products between the
m-th vector and the i-th vector calculated by the g-th WF
as τm,i,g , while the true inner product as τ truem,i . Then, the
indicator that we applied for verification is the average relative
error RE as defined in (32).
RE =
1
M
M∑
g=1
{
M∑
m=1
M∑
i=1
[∣∣τm,i,g − τ truem,i ∣∣/τ truem,i ]
}
(32)
Meanwhile, to choose an appropriate length L of the binary
hash code, we gradually increase L from 25 to 217. The aver-
age relative errors of the proposed algorithm under different
values of L are illustrated in Fig. 2, and the length of the binary
hash code is also shown. It can be observed that the error
decreases significantly as L increases, but it nearly stabilizes
when L reaches 211. Since more communication traffic will
be required with a larger L, we finally choose L as 211 bit
= 0.25 kb.Furthermore, the average relative error is 3.5×10−3
when L = 211, which proves the correctness of the proposed
algorithm.
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Fig. 2. Average relative error and its corresponding binary code length
C. Verification of the PPD EM Algorithm
We first use the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to
set the number of Gaussian components J , where J with the
lowest BIC is preferred. For more details, please refer to [44].
The BIC values of different J with 20 days of historical WP
and WPF data of 9 WFs are provided in Table I. According
to the result, we set J as 5.
Thereafter, we build the JPD of the WP of 9 spatially
correlated WFs using the proposed PPD EM algorithm. The
JPD constructed by the centralized EM algorithm is also given
as the benchmark. Since the 18-dimensional JPD cannot be
drawn for illustration, we derive several 1-dimensional and 2-
dimensional PDs from the 18-dimensional JPD based on the
linear invariance property of the GMM [2], [45].
The 1-dimensional probability distribution function (PDF)
and the 1-dimensional cumulative distribution function (CDF)
are shown in Fig. 3. Due to space limitations, only the first two
dimensions in the 18-dimensional JPD are provided. In Fig. 3,
the empirical PDs are obtained from the corresponding original
historical data, the benchmarks are built by the centralized EM
algorithm, and the PDs of each WF are constructed by the
proposed PPD EM algorithm. It can be observed that (1) both
the benchmark and the PDs of each WF match the empirical
PDs very well; (2) the PD curves of each WF are coincident
with each other, indicating that the consensus of probability
modeling is achieved by the proposed algorithm; and (3) the
PD curves of each WF are coincident with the benchmark,
indicating the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
TABLE I
BIC FOR DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF COMPONENTS
Selection J = 1 J = 2 J = 3 J = 4 J = 5
BIC (×104) -1.62 -1.70 -1.71 -1.72 -1.75
Selection J = 6 J = 7 J = 8 J = 9 J = 10
BIC (×104) -1.64 -1.59 -1.53 -1.52 -1.47
Further comparisons between the benchmark and the PDs
of each WF are made via relative standard error (RSE) as
defined in (33), where f(·) represents the PDF or CDF built
by each WF, f0(·) represents the benchmark PDF or CDF, and
f0(·) represents its mean value. The RSE results are provided
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in Fig. 4. First, all the results are less than 2.4× 10−3, which
means that the differences between the benchmark and the
PDs of each WF are extremely small. Second, compared with
a benchmark, e.g., the benchmark of the 1st dimensional CDF,
the RSE values of each WF are all equal to 4.8×10−5, showing
the consensus effect of the proposed algorithm. Third, the RSE
values between the CDFs are much smaller than that between
the PDFs since integrating the PDF will smooth the curve
and result in smaller differences. Note that CDFs are what
we ultimately want for optimal decisions, e.g., calculating
the quantile from the CDF. Thus, the RSE between CDFs
eventually indicates the accuracy of the proposed algorithm.
RSE =
∑N
n=1 [f(xn)− f0(xn)]2∑N
n=1
[
f0(xn)− f0(xn)
]2 (33)
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We also choose the 4th and the 5th dimensions from the
18-dimensional JPD to form a 2-dimensional PDF and a CDF
in Fig. 5. Due to space limitations, only the 2-dimensional
benchmark built by the centralized EM algorithm and the 2-
dimensional JPD built by the 1st WF via the proposed PPD
EM algorithm are illustrated. Thereafter, the Kullback–Leibler
divergence (KLD) between the JPDs built by the 1st WF and
by other WFs are given in Table II to illustrate the differences
between them. Since all the KLDs are less than 2.19×10−15,
the JPD built by the 1st WF and the JPDs built by others
are almost completely the same. Thus, using the 1st WF as a
representative is reasonable and acceptable. In Fig. 5, the 2-
dimensional PDF and CDF built by the 1st WF ideally match
the 2-dimensional benchmarks. Therefore, the correctness of
the proposed PPD EM algorithm is eventually verified.
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TABLE II
KL DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE 1ST WF AND OTHERS
Wind Farm 1 2 3 4 5
KLD (×10−15) 0 0.02 0.19 2.19 1.09
Wind Farm 6 7 8 9
KLD (×10−15) 0.33 1.11 2.06 1.01
D. The Robustness of the PPD EM Algorithm
To verify the robustness of the proposed PPD EM algorithm,
we cut off communication lines and inspect the CDFs of
the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 8th dimensions derived from the 18-
dimensional JPD. Since the consensus of the proposed algo-
rithm is already verified, we still use the modeling result of
the 1st WF as a representative. The CDFs built by the 1st WF
after the communication failure are shown in Fig. 6, where
the benchmark represents the CDFs built by the centralized
EM algorithm, Original represents the CDF built by the 1st
WF when no failure occurs, and line m–i represents the CDFs
built by the 1st WF when the communication between the m-
th WF and the i-th WF. For example, legend line 1-3 in Fig. 6
means that the communication between the 1st WF and the 3rd
WF fails while other communication lines operate normally.
In Fig. 6, the CDFs built by the 1st WF under different line
failures ideally coincide with the benchmark and the original
CDF, which proves that the proposed PPD EM algorithm
can still maintain high accuracy after communication failures.
Therefore, the robustness of the proposed algorithm is verified.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Based on additive homomorphic encryption and the average
consensus algorithm, we propose a PPD summation algorithm.
Based on the binary hash function and the average consensus
algorithm, we present a PPD inner product algorithm. Com-
bining the PPD summation and inner product algorithms, a
PPD EM algorithm to overcome the data vertical partitioning
problem is eventually developed. Compared with the central-
ized EM algorithm, the proposed PPD EM algorithm is fully
distributed in that it only needs local communication between
neighboring WFs. Meanwhile, it strictly protects the data
privacy of every WF during communications. Furthermore,
its robustness to communicate failure is guaranteed by the
consensus feature.
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